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I
n Grutter v. Bollinger, a 00 decision in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the University of Michigan’s admissions policy of con-
sidering race in order to enhance the school’s diversity, Justice Ginsburg 
wrote a powerful concurrence that applied international and comparative 
law to the interpretation of U.S. constitutional law. Although she did not 
agree with the majority’s decision to set a firm sunset date for the office 
of affirmative action, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the majority’s “ob-
servation that race-conscious programs ‘must have a logical end point,’ 
accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative 
action.” Specifically, Justice Ginsburg noted the consistency between the 
majority’s decision and the principles embraced in international treaties 
concerning the elimination of racial discrimination and discrimination 
against women.
  In a recent speech, Justice Ginsburg noted the deep American roots 
of an internationalist approach in, for example, the writings and pro-
nouncements of Professors Roscoe Pound and John Henry Wigmore, as 
well as John Adams. She also emphasized the tradition of judicial refer-
ence to foreign and international law, stating that “[t]he U.S. judicial sys-
tem will be poorer . . . if we do not both share our experience with, and 
learn from, legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy 
similar to our own.” She cited among several recent examples the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins v. Virginia and Lawrence v. Texas.4 
Justice Ginsburg referenced the U.S. Declaration of Independence and 
underscored her belief that “the U.S. Supreme Court will continue to 
accord ‘a decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind’ as a matter of 
comity and in a spirit of humility.” Eloquently and succinctly she con-
cluded, “[Y]ou will not be listened to if you don’t listen to others.”
  The need for such an internationalist approach is nowhere more press-
ing than in my own field, international refugee law, where the reference 
to international and comparative law is a matter of statutory, as well as 
constitutional, imperative. The Refugee Act of 980 was enacted with 
the explicit purpose of implementing the 967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Protocol).5 In particular, Article  of the Protocol de-
fines a refugee and Article  enunciates the foundational norm of non-
refoulement, the prohibition against returning a refugee to the country of 
anticipated persecution.
  In the human rights context, the Refugee Convention is a unique 
treaty in that there is no treaty-based international body with explicit 
norm-interpreting authority. Rather, the treaty is implemented through 
states parties’ judicial systems in the process of individual determinations 
of claims to refugee status eligibility and protection. Thus, states parties 
(including at times the United States, however haltingly), in a spirit of 
comity, have relied on each others’ doctrinal interpretations in creating a 
transnationalized body of international refugee law.
  In one of its major internationalist decisions, I.N.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 987 found that interpretation of the U.S. 
definition of a refugee must be consistent with the treaty upon which it 
was based. Given this background, Justice Blackmun in his concurrence 
emphasized that the administrative agency should be guided by interna-
tional standards when interpreting the Refugee Act and the United States’ 
treaty obligations under the Protocol because of the Protocol’s “rich his-
tory of interpretation in international law and scholarly commentaries.”6
  Earlier, in 986, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) 
wrote one of the seminal decisions in refugee law, Matter of Acosta, which 
has had broad international reach. In that case, the Board established 
the “immutable characteristics” paradigm for interpreting the “particular 
social group” (PSG) ground in the definition of refugee, rooting inter-
pretation in principles of non-discrimination fundamental to domestic 
and international law.7 In recognition of these principles and in a spirit of 
comity, other states parties, including the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the U.K. House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the United King-
dom), among others, have adopted the BIA’s approach to interpreting 
the PSG ground. This became a precedent for comity in interpretation 
of not only this but other provisions of the Refugee Convention as well.8 
However, even as this respect for the international nature of the treaty 
was being recognized broadly by other states parties, the United States 
backed off of its own Acosta precedent, precipitating a prolonged (and 
ongoing) battle within the United States regarding the meaning of the 
PSG ground for asylum.
  Sadly, the U.S. Supreme Court itself retreated from an internationalist 
approach in its infamous 99 decision Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
Inc., regarding the scope of refugee law’s fundamental non-refoulement or 
nonreturn obligation, despite the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees’ briefing to the contrary.9 In short, in the interpretation of 
a clearly international law-based statute, the United States has been both 
a leader and one of the most significant naysayers in bringing to bear 
principles from international and comparative law.
  Fortunately, in a recent 009 decision in which Justice Ginsburg joined 
the majority, Negusie v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the 
role of comparative sources in interpreting the “persecution of others” bar 
to asylum. Citing cases from Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand, the Court noted that, “[w]hen we interpret treaties, 
we consider the interpretations of the other courts of other nations, and 
we should do the same when Congress asks us to interpret a statute in 
light of a treaty’s language.”0
  Scholars and advocates have been trying hard to reverse the errone-
ous reinterpretation of the PSG ground of asylum, both preceding and 4
following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Negusie. We academics 
and practitioners in the field of refugee law thank Justice Ginsburg for 
taking leadership in legitimizing the role of comparative and interna-
tional law in our national context.
m
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